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Theo A.F. Kuipers
OVERDETERMINATION AND REFERENCE 
REPLY TO EMMA RUTTKAMP 
A couple of papers deal with the two (almost entirely) overlapping chapters of 
ICR (5, 6) and SiS (7, 8) and one or more chapters from either ICR or SiS. 
However, only the paper by Emma Ruttkamp mainly deals with the topics of 
other chapters from ICR and SiS. Her main aim is to defend a kind of realism, 
called model-theoretic realism, that can make sense of the problem of 
overdetermination of theories by empirical data, using nonmonotonic ways of 
reasoning. Instead of going into details about her widely encompassing and 
intriguing approach, I would like to elaborate on two points that are directly 
related to her main themes, viz. the problem of overdetermination and the 
problem of reference of theoretical terms. 
Underdetermination by Overdetermination 
In Section 3 Ruttkamp suggests most of the time that the problem of 
overdetermination of theories by data is strongly related to the distinction between 
observational and theoretical terms, the O/T distinction, and the changing 
semantic relations between models, empirical reducts, and empirical models. 
However, in Note 6 she gives a formulation that makes clear that this problem is 
already present without the O/T distinction and without changing semantic 
relations. I would like to call attention to this basic version of the problem within 
my own framework in ICR. I will explain that, besides the traditional problem of 
underdetermination, due to theoretical terms that leave room for observationally 
equivalent theories, there is a more basic problem of determination operative in 
scientific research, a kind that can partly be conceived as a problem of 
overdetermination. In my ICR framework (see Section 7.3.2) the data are 
represented by R(t), the set of realized possibilities up to t, i.e., the accepted 
instances, and by S(t), the strongest accepted law, based on R(t), where both are 
formulated within a previously chosen observational vocabulary. These data by 
Theo A. F. Kuipers 438
no means determine a theory, let alone the strongest true (observational) theory T,
corresponding to the set of nomic possibilities. Even if we restrict the attention to 
theories that are compatible with R(t) and S(t), that is, theories that can be 
represented as both a superset of R(t) and a subset of S(t), there will be, as a rule, 
many other theories besides T. Although by enlarging R(t) and hence narrowing 
down S(t) we zoom in on T in a two-sided way, normally speaking T remains 
underdetermined. However, R(t) or, more precisely, the theory with R(t) as its set 
of models, assuming that such a theory can be formulated, entails all the 
remaining theories “between R(t) and S(t),” including T and many more. As a 
matter of fact this holds for any subset and even any member of R(t). That is, after 
performing an experiment we can give a complete description of the realized 
physical possibility (relative to the observational vocabulary), which entails very 
many theories, including T itself. I am happy to agree with Ruttkamp’s Note 6 
that this is, in a sense, a problem of overdetermination.
A Problem of Reference 
In her concluding section, following the five questions I put forward in the 
introductory chapter of ICR, it becomes particularly clear that Ruttkamp’s model-
theoretic realism and my constructive realism are close relatives. The main 
difference seems to lie in our view of reference. Although she does not criticize 
my analysis in ICR in detail, it is clear that she favors an epistemological kind of 
reference, whereas my basic analysis is semantic and metaphysical. Since I came 
to realize after closing ICR that I leave an important problem concerning 
reference open there in Ch. 9, I would like to take the opportunity to formulate 
this problem briefly. It will certainly suggest that the contrast with Ruttkamp’s 
approach of reference be investigated further.
Let me start by quoting the most relevant summarizing claim in the 
concluding Chapter 13 of ICR (pp. 325-6):
Now we arrive at a highly idealized picture of (new) research, in which we make the main 
metaphysical assumptions explicit. The scientist assumes the existence of two 
unconceptualized natural worlds, THE ACTUAL WORLD and THE NOMIC WORLD. THE 
ACTUAL WORLD includes its history, and its future, and is at least partially made by 
humans, among others, by scientists who perform experiments. THE NOMIC WORLD on 
the other hand, exists independently of human beings. It encompasses THE ACTUAL 
WORLD, and is to be studied via that world. Studying THE ACTUAL and THE NOMIC 
WORLD requires conceptualizing them.
The specific topic of reference (and ontology) is summarized on p. 329:  
Recall that in CHAPTER 9 we have defined ‘reference’ primarily in a ‘domain and 
vocabulary’ relative way, viz., in terms of the nomic truth generated by them and THE 
NOMIC WORLD, according to the Nomic Postulate. For attribute terms, the crucial question 
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was whether the nomic truth is constrained by them; for entity terms, it was whether they 
occur as a domain-set of referring attribute terms. But we also suggested the possibility of 
basing on these definitions an absolute definition, viz., whether the term refers in at least one 
‘domain and vocabulary’ combination. Note that the link with the nomic truth assures that 
reference may just be a potential matter, not (yet) actual, in the sense that the relevant nomic 
possibilities need not (yet) have been realized. In other words, terms always refer to THE 
NOMIC WORLD if they refer at all, and they may or may not refer to THE ACTUAL 
WORLD.
  The corresponding ontology is roughly given by: entities and attributes exist as far as 
the corresponding terms refer. Note that the definitions are such that attributes only exist as 
far as there are entities having the attribute. Note also that, since reference is defined in terms 
of the nomic truth, there are again two kinds of existence, actual and potential. 
  To be sure, speaking of reference to, and existence in, THE NOMIC but not ACTUAL 
WORLD, is a way of speaking that has its risks. The more cautious way of speaking is to 
systematically talk about potential reference and existence. 
As said, after closing ICR I came to understand that there is a problem with this 
way of dealing with reference. Whether a combination of an entity term and an 
attribute term refer, using a set of these (potential) entities as one of its domain-
sets, will, in a context in which truth approximation is taken seriously, basically 
depend on whether something like these entities exists to which something like 
this attribute may or may not apply. However, what is “something like” in such a 
context? When do we say that there is nothing like that type of entity and that type 
of attribute, even apart from our probable lack of the epistemological means to 
apply the relevant terms? Maybe we should just take a formal point of view. As 
soon as the theoretical vocabulary introduces an entity and an attribute term they 
are supposed to be coupled to a combination of entities and an attribute “that are 
around” in the intended domain of application and that are not yet taken care of 
by the observational vocabulary. Of course, when more options are possible a 
choice will have to be made. I would like to conclude by conceding that these 
informal remarks still leave much to be desired. 
